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1. Identification 
Scottish Carbon Capture & Storage (SCCS) is the largest Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
research group in the UK. Our internationally renowned researchers work across the full CCS 
chain. Founded in 2005, we are a partnership of British Geological Survey, Heriot-Watt 
University, University of Aberdeen, the University of Edinburgh and the University of 
Strathclyde working together with universities across Scotland. SCCS is funded by the 
Scottish Funding Council. 
2. Executive summary 
• More than a decade of UK state R&D investment, totalling in excess of £250 million, has 
shown CCS to be effective, achievable and strategically beneficial to UK objectives. 
• The cancellation in November 2015 of the UK Government’s £1 billion CCS capital 
allocation is an unforeseen and fundamental change to UK energy and climate policy, 
carried out without consultation. 
• UK Committee on Climate Change (CCC) advice was framed in expectation of UK CCS 
commercialisation programme delivery leading to routine delivery of the technology on 
electricity generation and some process industries towards 2030s. 
• Removal of the CCS contribution towards the Fifth Carbon Budget and beyond severely 
limits flexibility in the delivery of other low-carbon generation, especially new nuclear 
where forecast delivery is increasingly in doubt – the CCC and the Department of Energy 
and Climate Change (DECC) should consider the impact of scenarios with no CCS and 
delayed nuclear capacity. 
• There appears to be a misinterpretation by government of CCS as a technology that 
could be purchased as and when required, when it is in fact a core low-carbon enabling 
infrastructure requiring strategic development. 
• In the absence of a clear CCS pathway, there is a risk that investors in new gas capacity 
will price in increased risk of reduced plant operation due to carbon budget constraints, 
and increasing the cost to consumers.  
• The siting of any new gas plant, subject to capture readiness, should be assessed with 
respect to the viability (and cost) of pipeline and/or shipping connection to identified and 
secure CO2 storage sites. 
• There is now no pathway to decarbonising high-emission industries. Government should 
urgently investigate and evaluate the potential to connect, in a stepwise manner, CO2 
emissions from industrial sources to storage. 
• The UK delegation to the Paris UNFCCC climate talks presented the UK Climate Change 
Act as exemplar of national action, so this must be implemented domestically. The Paris 
Agreement increases climate change mitigation ambition. As a member of the “high 
ambition coalition” the UK should work towards net zero emissions by 2050 rather than 
an 80% reduction. 
• Setting the Fifth Carbon Budget as advised does not secure either the 80% or 100% 
reductions trajectory. It is technology and especially infrastructure choices informed by a 
long-term view towards the 2050 goal that should receive attention in this debate. 
3. Carbon Capture and Storage context 
3.1 
CCS is a core component of national, regional (EU) and global decarbonisation pathways 
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consistent with achieving climate mitigation objectives 1 2 3 . For some applications (e.g. 
electricity, heat) CCS enables a least-cost transition for the whole economy. For others (e.g. 
process industry, gas sweetening, synthetic transport fuel) CCS is currently the sole option.  
3.2 
Globally, the first generation of commercial-scale CCS projects is in operation or under 
construction on coal power plant, gas processing, refining and steel production. These are 
primarily located in North America, the Middle East and Norway. With the exception of the 
Sleipner (operated since 1996) and Snøhvit (operated since 2008) gas sweetening projects in 
Norway, to date no commercial CCS projects have begun construction within Europe.    
3.3 
The UK is widely recognised to be uniquely well-positioned to develop, advance and benefit 
from CCS. The UK North Sea is an exceptionally well understood, socially permitted, and 
industry recognised CO2 storage resource. More than a decade of UK state R&D 
investment, totalling in excess of £250m, has shown CCS to be effective, achievable 
and strategically beneficial both to delivering the UK’s decarbonisation obligations at least 
cost and bringing new industry and revenue to the UK. There are additional benefits for the 
UK, including transfer of offshore skills and investment, development of efficient oil production 
with CO2-EOR, licensing fees to store CO2 from European states, and effective re-use of 
existing infrastructure, which defers decommissioning payments by UK Treasury. There are 
clear potential markets for UK skills in relation to designing and installing large numbers of 
CCS projects in China, the Middle East and Far East. 
3.4 
In November 2015, on the same day as HM Treasury’s Autumn Spending Review, the UK 
Government announced the sudden withdrawal of the UK’s £1bn capital funding allocation to 
the UK CCS commercialisation programme. This was prior to the imminent completion of the 
publicly funded CCS competition Front End Engineering and Design (FEED) studies by the 
Peterhead and White Rose projects, and without any consultation with stakeholders. At 
present, DECC has not put forward any revised strategy for CCS enablement, and statements 
by the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Energy 
and Climate Change have presented a muddled view, with CCS seen as “not working”, “too 
expensive”, and a possible “long-term” need.   
3.5 
The cancellation of CCS capital funding occurred on the eve of the presentation by the CCC 
of its Fifth Carbon Budget (2028-2032) recommendations. As such, the CCC’s advice was 
framed in the expectation of the completion of the UK CCS commercialisation 
programme and likely delivery of at least one CCS project on electricity before 2020, 
facilitating the potential for a second phase of CCS projects from the early-mid 2020s 
and leading to the routine operation of established CCS on electricity and some 
process industries from 2030.  
                                                       
1 International Energy Agency (2015): Carbon Capture and Storage, The Solution for Deep Emissions Reductions 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/CarbonCaptureandStorageThesolutionfordeepemissio
nsreductions.pdf 
2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014): Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report, Summary for 
Policymakers, https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf 
3 Energy Technologies Institute (2016): ETI analysis of the UK energy system design implications of delay to 
deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the UK, http://www.eti.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/ETI-letter-to-Chair-on-Future-of-CCS.pdf 
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We therefore address the questions of this enquiry, reflecting on this abrupt, unexpected and 
substantial change to the UK’s energy and climate policy and decarbonisation strategy.  
4. What is your view on the Committee on Climate Change’s advice on 
the Fifth Carbon Budget? 
4.1 
We agree with the CCC’s advice on the Fifth Carbon Budget in general and specifically with 
regard to CCS. 
4.2 
The CCC’s Fifth Carbon Budget report correctly identifies the critical importance of near-term 
(2020s) roll-out of commercial-scale CCS, sited in the UK, in achieving the robust delivery of 
the UK Climate Change Act at lowest overall cost. Here, the CCC recognises the unique 
economy-wide value of CCS, providing low-carbon despatchable power generation, 
addressing industrial emissions and “opening up new decarbonisation pathways”.   
4.3 
However, the CCC’s central scenario assumed completion of the UK’s CCS 
commercialisation programme with project investment in this Parliament enabling subsequent 
CCS deployment through the 2020s. This is now no longer credible. As a result, we turn to 
the “no CCS” scenario presented by the CCC – albeit even this assumes delivery of the 
commercialisation programme projects and corresponding delivery of 0.6GW low-carbon 
generation. This scenario fails to deliver sub 100g CO2/kWh power sector generation intensity 
by 2030, introduces reliance on largely unquantifiable (in cost or development timescale) 
delivery of alternative on-demand generation sources and fails to provide a coherent 
decarbonisation pathway for industrial emissions.   
4.4 
Further, we reflect that delivery of a new generation of nuclear plant, both in scale of 
generation and timing of operation, remains uncertain. Given successive postponements of 
the Hinkley Point C project’s projected completion dates (now suggested to be 2025), the 
most recent Final Investment Decision deferment on 27 Jan 20164 is characteristic of the 
ongoing construction time and cost overruns on similar reactors in France and Finland, 
leading to exceptionally poor delivery of reliable electricity generation capacity for this reactor 
type. Given the generally long lead-in times (well in excess of 10+ years) for nuclear power 
development in Europe, there is currently very little to guarantee that new nuclear capacity 
will be operational by 2030 at the scales envisioned in the CCC’s scenarios. As a “plan B”, 
the CCC’s “no nuclear scenario” uses a large CCS contribution to cover this shortfall – 
an option that is now most likely unavailable. What is Plan B now? 
4.5 
Assessing the CCC’s projections in the absence of both CCS and new nuclear delivery by 
2030, a generation shortfall of around 64-90TWh in 2030 (17-24% of expected demand) is 
suggested, with a likely carbon intensity increase to 144-180g CO2/KWh (54-93% over the 
central scenarios) subject to the proportions of the shortfall met by renewables, 
interconnectors and unabated gas.  
                                                       
4 BBC 2016: Decision on new nuclear power plant 'delayed', http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35415187 
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4.6 
In the case of meeting the power generation gap entirely with unabated gas, it appears that 
exclusion of CCS and delay to nuclear delivery could double the predicted 2030 carbon 
intensity of generation and/or preclude the envisaged electrification of heating and transport, 
making the fifth (and subsequent) carbon budgets likely unattainable. We suggest that the 
CCC might be invited to assess a “no CCS and delayed nuclear” scenario with arising 
consequences and options. 
4.7 
Outwith power generation, the CCC correctly highlights the need for a “strategic approach” to 
the development and deployment of CCS for industry decarbonisation. Here, the CCC 
foresaw the synergy of industrial emitters being able to connect and cluster with the CO2 
infrastructures of CCS power plant “anchor” projects. This approach is now undermined, such 
that there now appears to be no coherent UK pathway towards supporting industrial 
decarbonisation. This risks driving out industry from the UK as the reformed Phase 4 of the 
EU Emission Trading Scheme is implemented from 20215. 
5. Should the Government set the Fifth Carbon Budget in line with the 
Committee on Climate Change’s advice? 
5.1 
We would support the setting of the Fifth Carbon Budget in line with the CCC’s advice and 
emphasise that action to progress CCS is implicit in that advice. 
5.2 
The Fifth Carbon Budget as proposed appears consistent with the general emissions 
reduction pathway towards delivery of the UK Climate Change Act’s final goal of a minimum 
80% emissions reduction by 2050. Given the extensive promotion of the Act by the Prime 
Minister, Ministers and officials during the recent UNFCCC Paris COP21 negotiations as a 
robust model for delivering the UK decarbonisation, a failure to domestically endorse and 
agree to the budget as advised could widely damage UK credibility.  
5.3 
The UNFCCC Paris Agreement increases the ambition of the international climate change 
mitigation goal that framed the UK Climate Change Act. The deal seeks net zero global 
emissions in the second half of the century (Article 4), to achieve the revised temperature 
target of “well below 2°C […] and to pursue efforts to limit […] to 1.5°C” (Article 2). As a 
member of the “high ambition coalition”, Government should arguably consider the 
Fifth Carbon Budget as a minimum requirement and actively pursue increased 
ambition for the UK’s domestic decarbonisation pathway so as to reach net zero 
emissions by 2050. Assuming adoption of the Fifth Carbon Budget as proposed, reaching 
net zero emissions would entail reducing total UK emissions by an additional 2000 million 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent in the period 2030-2050 compared with achieving the minimum 80% 
reduction set in the Act.  This means that carbon reduction on energy alone is insufficient. To 
obtain net zero emissions by 2050 requires a scaling up of ambitions to offset all UK 
emissions. At present, CCS is the only technology capable of reaching into many of the 
diverse sectors of the UK economy, where emissions reductions will be required. 
                                                       
5 DG Climat Action (2016): EU-ETS Revision for phase 4 (2021-2030) 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/revision/index_en.htm 
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5.4 
Setting the Fifth Carbon Budget as advised does not, in itself, secure either the 80% or 
indeed 100% reductions trajectory. Rather, it is technology and especially infrastructure 
choices informed by the long-term view towards the 2050 goal that should receive 
particular attention in this debate. 
5.5 
Here, we emphasise the unique role of CCS as the “glue that holds together” the long-term 
goal of economy-wide decarbonisation and suggest that setting the Fifth Carbon Budget as 
proposed in the absence of a robust “plan B” for CCS delivery would appear fanciful.  
6. What challenges will the Government face in meeting the Fifth 
Carbon Budget? 
6.1 
We urge the Government to acknowledge and enact the role of CCS in meeting the UK’s Fifth 
Carbon Budget or risk failing to meet decarbonisation targets with the extra cost this will incur. 
6.2 
CCS deployment is crucial to the robust, least-cost delivery of the Fifth Carbon Budget and 
the ongoing 2050 decarbonisation pathway.  
6.3 
Currently, following the November 2015 withdrawal of the £1bn capital funding for CCS 
commercialisation, Government has produced no clarity on either CCS intent or future action. 
This not only removes near-term (2020s) availability of CCS but also risks its unavailability in 
the 2030s and beyond. Here, there appears to be a misinterpretation by Government of 
CCS as a technology that could be purchased as and when required, when it is in fact a 
core low-carbon enabling infrastructure. The timely provision of this enabling infrastructure 
– CO2 transport and storage – requires strategic and coordinated UK development.  
6.3 
In particular, the evaluation of specific geological storage sites cannot be “bought in”. In the 
Central North Sea there is a closing opportunity to secure access to first-phase CO2 storage 
with operational oil and gas sector pipeline, platform and borehole facilities. Securing later re-
entry is uncertain and, certainly, higher cost. Additionally, the window of opportunity is also 
closing for enablement of CO2-Enhanced Oil Recovery (CO2-EOR), which analysis suggests 
could deliver a seven times return on national investment for Government6.  
6.4 
It is critical that Government and the recently established Oil and Gas Authority (OGA) do not 
agree to decommissioning potentially relevant pipelines, boreholes or offshore facilities while 
re-evaluation of the UK’s CCS options and strategy is under way. It may be that the burden of 
proof should be reversed, such that existing operators have to demonstrate no feasible re-use 
of the pipelines, boreholes and offshore compression before any decommissioning is agreed. 
Here, the role of offshore shipping could be especially important to enable effective use of 
existing offshore infrastructure with lower risk gradational financial investment. 
                                                       
6 SCCS (2015): CO2 storage and Enhanced Oil Recovery in the North Sea: Securing a low-carbon future for the 
UK, http://www.sccs.org.uk/images/expertise/reports/co2-eor-jip/SCCS-CO2-EOR-JIP-Report-SUMMARY.pdf 
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6.5 
Similarly for CO2 capture, the policy and practical processes large and small to convert 
existing plant sites, facilities and equipment to capture 50-90% of CO2 emissions cannot 
simply be purchased at the moment of need. These require timely evolution within national 
and regional government, authorities, agencies and commercial sectors. 
6.6 
For power generation the absence of CCS in the 2020-2030s will severely restrict flexibility in 
delivery of other decarbonisation components (especially new nuclear – see 4.4 above) and 
corresponding electrification of transportation and heating, and will encourage and enforce an 
increased reliance on largely untested and uncosted options (e.g. hydrogen, extensive 
biomass use, and Small Modular Nuclear, which requires Combined Heat and Power (CHP) 
networks to be built).  
6.7 
The Government recently announced its intention to cease coal generation in the UK by 
2023-2025 (SoS DECC Rudd, October 2015), though we note with concern the equivocal 
wording of DECC’s 26th January 2016 statement on energy actions7. Should the new gas 
generation to replace this capacity be delivered, it has been stated by Energy Minister, 
Andrea Leadsom, (All Party Parliamentary Group on CCS, January 2015) that it will be 
subject to CCS “capture-readiness” requirements. In the absence of near-term CCS 
demonstration – in particular, on gas – the absence of an organised institutional pathway to 
decouple CO2 infrastructure investment from individual power or industry CCS plant 
development and a plan to deliver confidence to enable secure investment in CO2 transport 
and storage infrastructure, it is likely that investors in new gas capacity will price in the 
greater risk of reduced plant operation due to carbon budget constraints. This will, as a 
result, lead to increased costs to consumers.  
6.8 
There is a complete absence of forward planning for infrastructure retention in the UK North 
Sea, and for new-build infrastructure to connect “capture-ready” power plant to CCS transport 
and storage offshore. To fulfil CCS-ready obligations, it is essential to consider onshore and 
offshore pipelines and the retention of offshore boreholes for CO2 injection into storage sites. 
6.9 
The siting of any new gas plant should be assessed with respect to the viability (and 
cost) of pipeline and/or shipping connection to identified and secured CO2 storage 
sites. These considerations will likely alter optimal new plant siting locations from those 
assessed only under gas supply connection and power transmission costs.  
6.10 
For industrial decarbonisation, as noted above (see 4.7), the curtailing of power generation 
“anchor” project delivery removes the assumed cluster connection pathway for enabling 
industrial CCS. Significant engagement with industry emitters has demonstrated strong 
interest in CCS, which is now at risk of being lost.  
                                                       
7 DECC (2016): What the Government is doing to secure investment in clean, secure and affordable energy, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/what-the-government-is-doing-to-secure-investment-in-clean-secure-and-
affordable-energy 
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6.11 
We strongly suggest that Government should urgently evaluate the potential to connect, 
in a stepwise manner, CO2 emissions from industrial sources to storage, potentially re-
using existing pipeline and offshore assets to develop industrial CCS at lower investment cost 
and risk. Here, it is clear that shipping is a viable technological option for CO2 transport along 
the UK coast, collecting high-concentration industrial CO2 available at reduced capture cost, 
or CO2 imported from Europe, and transferring ownership to North Sea storage or CO2-EOR8. 
The alternative is increased pressure on the viability of industrial regions as reforms to the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (phase 4) tighten the availability of free allowances.    
  
                                                       
8 SCCS (2016): Scottish CO2 Hub – a unique opportunity for the United Kingdom, 
http://www.sccs.org.uk/images/expertise/reports/working-papers/wp-2016-01.pdf 
